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J. L. Schellenberg (born 1959) is a Canadian philosopher best known for his work in philosophy of religion. He has a DPhil in Philosophy from the University of Oxford, and is Professor of Philosophy at Mount Saint Vincent University and Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Graduate Studies at Dalhousie University.〔Schellenberg CV, p. 1.〕 Schellenberg’s early development of an argument from divine hiddenness for atheism has been influential.〔Howard-Snyder 2013, 141.〕 In a subsequent series of books he has arrived at a form of religion called ‘skeptical religion’ which he regards as being compatible with atheism.〔Schellenberg 2013a, 147.〕 In 2013 the Cambridge University Press journal ''Religious Studies'' published a special issue devoted to critical discussion of Schellenberg’s philosophy of religion.〔Robin LePoidevin, ed. ''Religious Studies'' 49(2), 2013.〕 == Divine hiddenness == Schellenberg’s first book, ''Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason'' (Cornell University Press, 1993), developed the argument from divine hiddenness (or hiddenness argument) against the existence of God. Discussion of Schellenberg’s argument continues today, in academic journals, anthologies, and other books, as well as online.〔Howard-Snyder and Moser, eds., 2002; Cuneo 2013; Murray and Taylor 2007, pp. 376-377; Dumsday 2010, 423-424; http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/john_schellenberg/〕 Schellenberg’s most recent statement of the hiddenness argument may be summarized as follows. A God (construed as a perfect personal being) could not be less than perfectly loving, and a perfectly loving God would always be open to a meaningful conscious relationship with finite persons who are capable of participating in such a relationship and don’t resist it. This implies that if there is a God, every finite person who fits that description is able to exercise his or her capacity and be part of such a relationship. But this can’t be the case unless everyone who fits that description believes that God exists (for to have a conscious relationship with someone you have to believe they exist). It follows that if there is a God, there is no one who fits that description and fails to believe that God exists, i.e., there are no ‘nonresistant nonbelievers.’ But there are. Therefore, there is no God.〔Schellenberg, “Recent notes,” Session 2, pp. 2-3.〕 Critics have argued that even a loving God might have reasons to be hidden generated by such things as the requirements of human freedom, human unreadiness for relationship with God, or the religious value of doubt.〔Swinburne 1998, p. 209; McKim 2001, p. 101; Poston and Dougherty 2007, 195-196.〕 Schellenberg has replied that philosophers have no reason to assume that the persons God would create would be human persons existing in a world like ours, and that there are various ways in which the same good states of affairs to which critics appeal would be capable of being experienced in the context of a relationship with God.〔Schellenberg 2007a, 202-203; Schellenberg 2010, pp. 515-516.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「J. L. Schellenberg」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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